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Abstract—Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is a broad
cryptographic concept that can be adopted for privacy-preserving
computation. With MPC, a number of parties can collaboratively
compute a function, without revealing the actual input or output
of the plaintext to others. The applications of MPC range from
privacy-preserving voting, arithmetic calculation, and large-scale
data analysis. From the system perspective, each party in MPC
can run on one compute node. The compute nodes of multiple
parties could be either homogeneous or heterogeneous; however,
the distributed workloads from the MPC protocols tend to be
always homogeneous (symmetric). In this work, we study a
representative MPC framework and a set of MPC applications
from the system performance perspective. We show the detailed
online computation workflow of a state-of-the-art MPC protocol
and analyze the root cause of its stall time and performance
bottleneck on homogeneous and heterogeneous compute nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the era of big data, cross-computing of massive data can
provide better support for many domains such as scientific
research, healthcare data analysis, and financial analyst. Mean-
while, for many data providers, they cannot share the raw
data to the public for information security or benefit reasons.
Therefore, privately sharing the data among multiple parties
to compute collaboratively is a challenging task that attracts
numerous researchers in the cryptographic area to work on.
The high-level solution to compute collaboratively and
privately is to adopt secure multi-party computation (MPC).
With complicated building blocks such as Garble Circuit(GC),
Oblivious Transfer(OT), or Homomorphic Encryption(HE), it
can hide the sensitive information and preserve the privacy
between a group of distrusting parties. In other words, it
can provide data demanders with multi-party collaborative
computing capabilities without leaking the original data from
data providers.
From the system perspective, MPC has promising re-
search and commercial value, as it expands the scope of
traditional distributed computing with the add-on privacy-
preserving feature. However, the challenge of implementing
MPC on a large-scale distributed system is, the computation
and communication overhead coming from the protocol are
increasing with the number of participated parties due to the
cryptographic protocol’s complexity. In contrast, the goal for
distributed computing is to distribute the workloads among
several compute nodes evenly so that we can exploit the power
from parallel computing to decrease the overall computation
time. Therefore, a more practical setting, secure two-party
computation(2PC), can be adopted to achieve better perfor-
mance while providing the data collected from one party is
hidden for the other party. Each party can be viewed as a root
node that collects data from a number of parties that trust each
other.
The MPC protocol involves interactive computation and
communication phases, and even in the two-party setting,
if the two parties have imbalanced computation power, the
stalls coming from the interactive protocol can be exacerbated.
A simple case would be, one party is a laptop while the
other party is a powerful server. Currently, the cryptographic
protocol designs do not consider the setting of heterogeneous
systems. Therefore, it’s not well known how MPC protocols
would suffer from such a setting. As a result, in this work,
we would like to study the potential performance bottleneck
of MPC protocols in an imbalanced system setting and help
the system researchers to understand the new set of crypto-
graphic applications. We select ABY [4], a fast and flexible
2PC framework as our evaluation candidate. We show that
on two types of cloud nodes, how imbalanced computation
capabilities could harm the online phase performance with
several case studies. We further discuss the potential solutions
to mitigate such issues.
II. BACKGROUND
A. An overview on MPC
MPC [7], [17], [18] has significantly advanced the devel-
opment of privacy-preserving computation with data held by
different parties. Garbled circuits (GC) [2], [17], [18] were
first proposed for MPC: creating the garbled circuit and then
securely evaluating the result of a function without disclosing
private inputs by different parties. To date, with appropriate
composition [6], [12], [13], MPC framework can be designed
using a wide variety of cryptographic primitives such as
garbled circuit (GC) [2], homomorphic encryption (HE) [5],
[14], secret sharing (SS) [16] and oblivious transfer(OT) [15].
The core of the mainstream MPC frameworks primarily
use GC, OT and SS as their building block. For example, in
Yao’s GC, the public function is written as a GC; the sender
will “garble” the circuit based on its own inputs, and send
the “garbled” circuit to the receiver. Then, both parties apply
OT to generate the receiver’s “garbled” inputs. The receiver
lastly evaluates the circuit using all “garbled” inputs. The
communication rounds for Yao’s GC is constant but requires
symmetric cryptographic operations in the online phase, which
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could be slow. In contrast, another set of frameworks, GMW
[8] and BGW [1], utilize SS to split the secret into multiple
shares. Each party secret-shares their input, and then perform
entire computation and GC evaluation on the shares instead
of the whole inputs. The schemes used to split secrets can
either use Boolean circuits (XOR, AND, MUX) or Arithmetic
circuits(addition, multiplication). With SS, each party can pre-
compute all cryptographic operations and reduce the online
phase computation time.
B. Implementing MPC on heterogeneous systems
MPC can be widely used to privately calculate a number
of applications, such as the millionaire problem [10], private
set intersection [9], inner-product [11] and so on. Ideally,
any computing system can be as one party during the MPC
process. A more realistic case is that the parties will not have
the exactly same computation power. However, current MPC
protocols are mostly symmetric in terms of communication
and computation overhead.
While deploying the MPC protocols, the heterogeneity of
the computational capabilities may result in poor resource
utilization. For example, a weak party with limited computa-
tion power may delay the overall MPC computation if we do
not consider such constraints in the MPC protocol design. In
another word, the workload on each party are not proportional
to the computation power.
To understand how MPC will perform on homogeneous
and heterogeneous nodes, in this work, we evaluate selected
applications and different underlying secret sharing methods
with a 2PC framework, ABY [4]. The goal of our work
is to show how much under-utilization could happen with
heterogeneous party setting versus homogeneous party setting,
and envision the approaches to mitigate such resource under-
utilization.
III. CASE STUDY: ABY FRAMEWORK
A. Supported Sharing Schemes
ABY is a novel 2PC framework that supports mixed MPC
protocols in the semi-honest adversary model. In ABY, it sup-
ports three types of secret sharing: Arithmetic, Boolean, and
Yao’s GC. In this paper, we focus on the Arithmetic sharing
and Boolean sharing which are proved have a good online
phase efficiency with low latency during communication. The
Arithmetic sharing, which was first studied in [3], is based on
additive sharing private values between parties. The Arithmetic
sharing semantics is constructed by three parts: shared values,
sharing, and reconstruction. The shared variable x is denoted
as 〈x〉A and the individual share of 〈x〉A is held by party
Pi as 〈x〉Ai . First, we have 〈x〉A0 + 〈x〉A1 ≡ x (mod 2l) with
〈x〉A0 , 〈x〉A1 ∈ Z2l from an l-bit Arithmetic Sharing 〈x〉A
of x. Next, in the sharing part, Pi chooses r ∈R Z2l , sets
〈x〉Ai = x − r, and sends r to P1−i, who sets 〈x〉A1−i = r.
Finally, for reconstruction, Pi−1 sends its share 〈x〉A1−i to Pi
who computes x = 〈x〉A0 + 〈x〉A1 . The Pi obtains the value of
x as output is denoted as x = RecAi (〈x〉A) at reconstruction
process. After both parties obtain the value x, then we have
RecA(〈x〉A).
As for the Boolean sharing, it uses an XOR-based secret
sharing scheme to share a variable. The Boolean sharing also
has three parts which are defined by its sharing semantics. A
Boolean share 〈x〉B of a bit x is first shared between parties:
〈x〉B0 ⊕ 〈x〉B1 = x with 〈x〉B0 , 〈x〉B1 ∈ Z2 . Then, Pi chooses
r ∈R {0, 1} and computes 〈x〉Bi = x ⊕ r. P1−i receives
r from Pi and sets 〈x〉B1−i = r. After sharing, Pi−1 sends
its share 〈x〉B1−i to Pi who computes x = 〈x〉B0 ⊕ 〈x〉B1 .
Although Boolean and Arithmetic sharing have a similar
sharing semantics, the construction process of these two types
of garble circuits is different. As mentioned in Section 2, the
Arithmetic circuit is a sequence of addition and multiplication
gates, while the Boolean sharing consist of XOR and AND
gates. Despite all that, both of the sharing schemes can work
with the same steps in the framework.
B. Breakdown the Online Phase
The entire execution of ABY can be divided into the offline
phase and the online phase. During the offline phase, the
framework starts with preprocessing, such as system initializa-
tion, setup, and GC generation. Once the offline phase is done,
the framework starts the online phase that contains several
iterations of computation and communication. As shown in
Figure 1, there are four steps in the online phase: local
evaluation, interactive evaluation, performing interactive, and
finish layer evaluation. After the pre-computation at the offline
phase, the addition of Arithmetic sharing and XOR of Boolean
sharing operations are computed at the local evaluation layer.
This step is computation only; therefore, a faster machine can
complete the task with less computation time.
Then, shared values are sent for the interactive evaluation.
For example, in the arithmetic sharing, the arithmetic circuit
consists of addition and multiplication gates. Therefore, in
the interactive evaluation, each party needs first to find out
all the arithmetic gates and then distinguish the type of each
gate. More specifically, party A has to find out which gates
are its own input gates and which gates belong to party
B. As for the output gates, party A also has to figure out
whether the gates belong to itself or party B’s or both of
them. After this interactive evaluation, the two parties can
perform interactive communications so that they can share
their value and then reconstruct the value they shared privately.
The time of the value sharing and reconstruction is considered
as communication time, which consists of the time stalled
when waiting for data sharing from the other party. The last
step in the online phase is the finish layer evaluation, where
the shared values are computed at the local machine again
after each party reconstructs their receive value.
After all these three evaluation processes, a whole single
round of online phase is completed, and the next round starts
from the first step. The whole online phase matches the sharing
semantics, which we defined before.
Clearly, the online phase of the ABY has computation-
intensive and communication-intensive steps, and the inter-
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Fig. 1: ABY online phase
active operations between parties highly rely on the shared
secret data received from the other party. In other words,
there is a synchronization barrier between the steps in the
online phase. When the parties are running on two machines
with similar system specification, the data sharing can finish
almost simultaneously. However, if the two parties are on
two heterogeneous machines, the synchronizations have to be
delayed due to the slower party in this case. In the next section,
we show an in-depth performance analysis on the online phase
and study how the input size, sharing scheme, application,
system setting could impact the overall online phase time.
IV. EVALUATED SYSTEMS AND APPLICATIONS
A. System Setup
We deploy the ABY framework on two compute nodes
on the Chameleon cloud. We select two types of instances:
Low Power Xeon and Atom. The hardware configurations are
shown in Table I. The Atom node is considered to be a weak
node, while the Low Power Xeon is a strong node. In the
experiments, we let the two parties run both on Xeon, both
on Atom, and one on each. The results of the experiments are
the average of 10 executions unless stated otherwise.
TABLE I: System setup
Node Type Low Power Xeon Atom
CPU version Intel E3-1284L v4@2.90GHz
Intel C2750
@2.40GHz
Cores/Threads 4/8 8/8
Cache
(L1d/L1i/L2/L3)
32KB/32KB/
256KB/6MB
24KB/32KB/
1MB/X
RAM Size (GB) 32 32
B. Dataset and Application
We evaluate two privacy-preserving applications in our
experiments. The first one is to compute the inner product of
two vectors using arithmetic sharing. Each party holds only
one input vector, and both parties would like to receive the
output of the computation. The vector size is considered as the
input size that we can adjust for benchmarking. Each element
in the vector is set at 16-bit long.
The second application is the millionaire probability prob-
lem, which is a classical application used in MPC. Boolean
sharing is used to compute the results. Random values are
given to the two parties as to the input, and the application
finds out which party holds more significant value and send
the answer to both parties. The bit length of the input value
can be adjusted for benchmarking. The symmetric key length
is set at 128 in all cases.
V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Inner Product
In this section, we show the execution time breakdown
of the online phase with the inner product application. The
experiments are done on three sets of systems with small and
large input sizes. We set the number of elements in the input
vector to 27 as the small input size and 217 as the large input
size.
In each table, we report the time spent on each step of
the online phase. The local gates, interactive gate, and layer
finish denote the communication time spent on each node.
The communication time denotes the time spent waiting for
the secret data from the other party. The online phase time
sum up all the time spent on previous steps.
TABLE II: Inner Product with Atom Nodes
Small Large
Arithmetic local gates(ms) 0.054 0.045 47.570 47.528
Interactive gate(ms) 0.048 0.042 17.508 17.529
Layer finish(ms) 0.060 0.060 56.929 56.046
Communication(ms) 0.823 0.708 3.882 3.652
Online phase(ms) 1.563 1.526 154.869 154.853
TABLE III: Inner Product with Xeon Nodes
Small Large
Arithmetic local gates(ms) 0.015 0.030 14.685 14.782
Interactive gate(ms) 0.020 0.023 7.323 7.212
Layer finish(ms) 0.024 0.034 19.472 19.355
Communication(ms) 0.218 0.172 1.035 1.002
Online phase(ms) 0.474 0.479 52.234 52.098
Table II and III show the experimental results on two
homogeneous nodes setting. We can observe that, with small
input size, on two types of system, the communication time
dominates the overall online phase time. When the input size
increases, on both systems, the major online time is spent
on computation. Since the two machines in each system have
the same computation power, the overall stall time due to the
computation is minimal(around 2%) with large input size.
TABLE IV: Inner Product on Heterogeneous Nodes
Small input Xeon Atom
Arithmetic local gates(ms) 0.024 0.048
Interactive gate(ms) 0.024 0.053
Layer finish(ms) 0.032 0.059
Communication(ms) 1.016 0.489
Online phase(ms) 1.434 1.316
Large input Xeon Atom
Arithmetic local gates(ms) 14.339 47.341
Interactive gate(ms) 7.545 17.598
Layer finish(ms) 29.688 57.397
Communication(ms) 98.449 1.812
Online phase(ms) 156.724 156.712
Next, we deploy the framework on a heterogeneous system
so that the two parties have different computation capability.
As shown in Table IV, in this setting, we are observing a
skewed communication time between the two parties. The
party on the Xeon machine always has a longer communi-
cation time compared with the party on Atom machine: 2.07x
with a small input, and 54.33x with a large input. The reason
is that the workload assigned to both parties is the same;
however, the Atom node processes the computation much
slower compared to the Xeon node, especially when the input
size is growing. With the large input, the majority time spent
on Xeon is due to the stall: the communication time is 62.8%
of total online time. Clearly, such a situation is aggravated if
we want to compute more complicated tasks or a larger scale
of inputs.
B. Millionaire Probability
Similarly, we show our experimental results for the mil-
lionaire probability application. We vary the input bit length
to show the results for small (25) and large (215) input
size. The results of performance on homogeneous nodes are
shown in Table V and VI. We observe the same performance
trends as the inner product application: when the input size is
small, the communication time dominates (over 50%); while
the input size is large, more time is spent on computation,
only around 5% time is spent on the communication. This
observation confirms that small-scale 2PC is bounded by the
communication link, while large-scale 2PC is still bounded by
the computation. Besides, the boolean gates tend to add less
pressure on the local gate evaluation stage, compared with the
arithmetic gates.
TABLE V: Millionaire Probability with Atom Nodes
Small Large
Boolean local gates(ms) 0.032 0.035 26.820 26.723
Interactive gate(ms) 0.079 0.086 31.965 31.971
Layer finish(ms) 0.032 0.031 16.038 16.613
Communication(ms) 2.249 2.216 5.944 5.316
Online phase(ms) 3.482 3.575 83.331 83.168
TABLE VI: Millionaire Probability with Xeon Nodes
Small Large
Boolean local gates(ms) 0.011 0.020 7.073 7.127
Interactive gate(ms) 0.028 0.034 9.318 9.588
Layer finish(ms) 0.010 0.017 5.365 5.561
Communication(ms) 0.453 0.419 1.534 1.066
Online phase(ms) 0.847 0.865 24.014 24.066
Table VII shows how the heterogeneous system would have
an impact on the communication time on both nodes. We
observe the imbalanced computation time on both nodes,
similar to the case study on the inner product application
above. For the small input, the communication time on Xeon is
1.7x over Atom; for the large input, the communication time
on Xeon is significantly higher, which is 15.2x over Atom.
Obviously, the overall online phase performance is limited
by the slower party in the system. The stall time caused by
imbalanced computation power on Xeon with a large input is
69%.
TABLE VII: Millionaire Probability on Heterogeneous Nodes
Small input Xeon Atom
Boolean local gates(ms) 0.019 0.028
Interactive gate(ms) 0.043 0.071
Layer finish(ms) 0.022 0.029
Communication(ms) 1.184 0.679
Online phase(ms) 1.718 1.670
Large input Xeon Atom
Boolean local gates(ms) 7.594 26.688
Interactive gate(ms) 9.106 31.446
Layer finish(ms) 6.81 15.337
Communication(ms) 54.726 3.608
Online phase(ms) 79.323 79.398
C. Sensitivity Study
Lastly, we show how the input size can impact the overall
online time and the communication time on Xeon/Atom nodes
in a heterogeneous system. Figure 2 and 3 show the trend
of the reported metrics with various input sizes. With the
increasing input size, the Xeon node has an exponential in-
creasing communication time due to longer computation on the
Atom node. The root cause for such an imbalanced stall time
increase is because the initial 2PC workload distribution does
not consider the underlying computing node’s characteristics.
Such imbalance is aggravated when the computation load is
increasing. Based on the characterization, a more reasonable
MPC framework should consider the efficiency in not only
terms of cryptography complexity, but also the underlying
system that executes the protocols.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we start a system-level performance analysis
on a selected MPC framework, ABY, to show the root cause
of the performance bound on real systems. We identify the
common workflow for the secret data sharing and identify that
in a heterogeneous system with biased computation power,
the current protocol could cause an increasing stall time with
larger input size.
This work is the first step to analyze and optimize the
MPC protocols on systems. Our future work includes: 1)
characterize MPC protocol with increasing party number on
the system-level; 2) accelerate the MPC applications through
system-level optimization, such as overlapping the compu-
tation with communication; 3) co-designed MPC protocols
to enable reasonable data sharing with the consideration of
underlying party’s computation capability. The ultimate design
goal is to combine the system and cryptographic optimization
approaches to minimize the computation stall time due to the
imbalanced nodes.
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